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Philosophy and Theology
The debate over animal rights involves many different questions: Is eating
meat morally permissible? Can hunting be justified? Do sentient animals deserve
greater consideration than non-sentient human beings? (See Lawrence Cahoone,
“Hunting As a Moral Good,” Environmental Values, February 2009; Donald W.
Bruckner, “Considerations on the Morality of Meat Consumption: Hunted-Game
versus Farm-Raised Animals, Journal of Social Philosophy, Summer 2007; and
Jeff McMahan, “Eating Animals the Nice Way,” Daedalus, Winter 2008). I would
like to focus on a single aspect of the debate: Is species membership relevant to
ethical judgment?
Advocates for animal rights reject what they call “speciesism.” In “The Rights of
Animals and the Demands of Nature,” Dale Jamieson notes Peter Singer’s definition
of speciesism: “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of
one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (Environmental
Values, May 2008). Jamieson then states that “speciesism, like sexism and racism,
is a prejudice involving a preference for one’s own kind, based on a shared characteristic that in itself has no moral relevance.”
Before considering the arguments for and against speciesism, it is important
to point out that Singer’s definition of speciesism begs the question. The words
“prejudice” and “bias,” like the words “cruelty” and “merciless,” are not merely
descriptive but also negatively evaluative in a moral sense. Prejudice and bias
are wrong, so speciesism is also wrong simply in virtue of Singer’s stipulated
definition, regardless of any reasoned justification. Thus, Singer’s definition begs
the question. Let’s say the argument was not about animal rights, but about the
rights of the human fetus. I propose to be against “birthism,” which I define as a
prejudice or bias in favor of the interest of those who are born against those who
are not yet born. Birthism, like sexism and racism, is a prejudice involving a prefThe author thanks the Earhart Foundation for supporting this essay.
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erence for one’s own kind—those already born—based on a shared characteristic
that in itself has no moral relevance.1 Surely, to be against “birthism” is merely
another way of stating that I am in favor of fetal rights. Thus, invoking birthism
or speciesism does not settle the issue, but rather implicitly endorses one side of a
debated question. Precisely at issue is whether birthism or speciesism really is like
racism or sexism, and rhyming neologisms do not settle the ethical question. Let
me propose a definition of speciesism that does not beg the question: the belief that
species membership is ethically relevant.
In Dale Jamieson’s view, speciesism has two important features. “First, what is
of primary moral relevance is individuals and the properties they instantiate, not the
fact that they may be members of various collectives or kinds. Thus, for purposes
of morality, properties such as being a member of the Lions Club or a citizen of
the United States are not in themselves of central moral importance. Second, the
individual characteristics that are morally relevant are not properties such as species,
race and gender, but rather characteristics such as sentience, the capacity for desire
and self-consciousness.” Both features merit comment.
First, if we take “morally relevant” to mean necessary for basic rights and
dignity, then it would seem being members of some particular collectives or kinds
is morally irrelevant. No one’s basic moral rights should hinge on whether or not
they are members of the Lions Club or are citizens of the United States. However,
these examples do not show that membership in particular kinds is always irrelevant.
Presumably only those in the class of living beings can have a right to life, only those
in the class of sentient beings can have a right not to be tortured, and only those in
the class of intelligent beings can have a right to education. Indeed, when formulating
ethical norms or rules of public policy, it is necessary—if our formulations are to
make use of collective nouns and reflect ethical universalizability—to appeal to
groups membership of some kind.
Second, there is reason to believe that a characteristic such as sentience, the
capacity for desire and self-consciousness, is not necessary for basic moral status.2
A characteristic such as this comes in various degrees, so if ethical status is based
on the degree of possession of such a characteristic, then we have to hold that even
normal adult human persons do not have equal rights. Furthermore, a characteristic
such as this excludes some beings (such as handicapped newborns) that virtually
everyone accepts as persons with basic rights.
In his July 2009 article “Speciesism and Moral Status,” published in Meta
philosophy, Peter Singer, presents a graduated view of the moral status of humans
and nonhuman animals. Singer also includes an opposing view, represented by
Catholic tradition: “Pope John Paul II and those who accept his position on this
For arguments that birth is not a morally relevant characteristic, see chapter three in
Christopher Kaczor, The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question
of Justice (New York: Routledge, 2011).
2
For some arguments that sentience is not necessary for basic moral status, see Ibid.,
sections 4.1.4, 4.1.1, and 2.4 respectively.
1
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issue think not only that all humans are equal to each other but also that they are
far superior to nonhuman animals. The philosophical problem is whether we can
justify that view.”
Singer presents different theological justifications for the Catholic view: “1. We
are made in the image of God, and animals are not. 2. God gave us dominion over
animals. 3. We have immortal souls, and animals do not.” Additional grounds could
be added to Singer’s list, at least for Christians. Jesus commanded Peter to catch fish
(Luke 5:4), and he himself ate lamb during the Passover meal and ate fish (Luke 4:43).
According to the Christian view that Jesus is sinless, eating meat cannot be immoral
since Jesus both commands and commits such an action. Further, if killing an
animal for food is permissible, then Singer’s view on the necessary equal treatment
of human beings and animals cannot be correct because outside of life and death
scenarios no one believes we can kill human beings to eat them. By contrast, both
the teachings and actions of Jesus point to the intrinsic dignity of all human beings
regardless of health status (the leper), social status (the tax collector), or religion
and sex (the Samaritan woman). So, the actions and teachings of Jesus indicate that
there is a basic equality of human persons with each other and that human persons
have greater status than animals—at least greater than that of lambs and fish. Singer
rejects the theological justifications that he lists (though he gives no arguments to
justify his rejection); then he also asserts that even if these views were true, they
would provide no basis for law or public policy in a pluralistic society.
Here Singer confuses two distinct issues—ethics and public policy. It may be
that some action is ethically impermissible but ought not to be a matter of law. Even
if religious grounds are not a sound basis for public policy (here the arguments to
the contrary of Richard John Neuhaus are important to keep in mind 3 ), it might still
be the case that these religious arguments provide sound basis for religious people
to hold, as a matter of personal ethics, the view that all human beings are equal and
that all human beings have greater moral worth than all nonhuman animals.
A second reason for preferring human beings over animals that Singer considers
does not appeal to revelation. Singer summarizes his view of Kant’s defense of
human dignity:
Kant’s argument for why human beings are ends-in-themselves is that they
are autonomous beings, which, in terms of Kantian philosophy, means that
they are capable of reasoning. Note that Kant goes from defending the value
of autonomy or self-consciousness to maintaining that ‘man’ is the end. If we
really take his argument seriously it means that human beings who are not
self-conscious—because perhaps they are so profoundly mentally retarded
that they lack self-consciousness or self awareness—are also merely means
to an end, that end being autonomous or self-conscious beings.

So, according to Singer’s understanding of Kant, if a human being lacks selfconsciousness, then that human being does not have to be respected as an end‑in‑itself
and can be treated simply as a means.
Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in
America, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986).
3
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Singer misunderstands Kant’s position. Obviously, neither Kant nor any other
reasonable person thinks that actual self-consciousness is necessary for basic moral
worth. If this were so, whenever people were in surgery or otherwise unconscious,
they would lose their moral status only to gain it back after waking up. Singer is
correct to say that autonomy is central to Kantian ethics, but not because it is the
ground for human dignity. Rather, autonomy is important for Kant as a consequence
of Kant’s strict requirement that we do what is in accordance with duty, motivated
by duty (die pflichtmäßige Handlung aus Pflicht).4 For Kant, if emotional inclinations, such as desire for rewards or fear of punishments, dictate which action an
agent performs, then the agent’s action has an improper motivation and the act has
no moral worth. If we are to act rightly, our actions must be autonomous, motivated
by the self-given law of reason.
For Kant, all human beings, due to their rational nature (but not necessarily
their rational functioning), have inherent dignity. Kant would view the step toward
evaluating human worth in terms of functionality instead of ontology as a confusion
of persons and things. Things are evaluated according to how they function, and the
price of a thing is determined by human desire for the well- or badly functioning
thing. Beings of a rational nature have dignity but no price because they are the
possible seat of the only thing good without qualification, the good will. The value
of a rational being follows from its very nature, rather than from its function as a
being that is healthy or ill, young or old, beautiful or ugly, or even valued by others
or not valued by others.
The best historical treatment of Kant’s views on these matters is probably
Patrick Kain’s “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status,” which points out, with
respect to Immanuel Kant, that “personhood and responsibility does not entail that
each person acts or has acted, or that each is always able to act; it only entails that
when or if a person does act, she may be held responsible for her actions” (Journal
of the History of Philosophy, January 2009). Kain continues,
Within Kant’s theory, existence as a living member of the human species is
taken as a sufficient indication of basic moral status because membership
in that species indicates the presence, in a perceptible being, of the statusgrounding predisposition to personality. Since, according to Kant’s Formula
of Humanity, it is impermissible to treat any being with dignity as a mere
means, Kant’s position entails that it is impermissible to fail to treat any
human organism as an end-in-itself, which seems to entail a strong, though
defeasible, presumption against, for example, the intentional killing of any
human organism at any stage of its development.

Anyone interested in Kant’s thoughts on these matters should carefully study Kain’s
magisterial article, which corrects widespread misinterpretations of Kant like those
propounded by Singer.
Singer rounds out his reflections on the various grounds for believing in human
superiority over animals by treating social contract views (See, for example, Andrew
4
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. Karl Vorländer. (Hamburg: Feliz Meiner Verlag), 15.
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Cohen, “Contractarianism and Interspecies Welfare Conflicts,” Social Philosophy
and Policy, Winter 2009). Singer rejects the social-contract justification also, since
handicapped newborns cannot enter into contracts of any kind. Logi Gunnarsson
tries to shore up this difficulty, “There is an important difference between the great
apes in nature and severely disabled infants, a difference that does not concern their
intrinsic abilities but rather their relationship to humans: Only the latter are dependent
on humans for their well-being. The dependency of a being on a human being is a
source of a duty for human beings different in kind from the intrinsic abilities of the
great apes that give rise to duties toward them” (“The Great Apes and the Severely
Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts,” Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice, June 2008). The implicit premise seems to be that we have a moral duty
to provide for other human beings.
Eva Feder Kittay presents an interesting argument for this premise:
If [Jeff] McMahan, [Peter Singer], and others acknowledge the special
relationship that is constituted by parenthood, and if they can grant that
the parent of a child with the severe cognitive impairments has a deeper
and morally and objectively more significant relationship with that child
than does a pet owner with his beloved pet, then I believe that a number of
implications suggest that the recognition of the child as possessing moral
personhood must follow. I as a parent have obligations to fulfill toward
any child of mine. Following Sarah Ruddick, we can say that what a child
‘‘demands’’ of its parent is to assure that the child’s life is protected, that
the child’s development and growth are fostered, and, as I have already
pointed out, that the child can find social acceptance. Now, no parent with a
child of typical capacities can do this in a vacuum. All parents need access
to certain resources to fulfill their obligations to their child, ones that are at
least partially supplied by the larger society. Every parent needs schools and
other social institutions to ensure that her child can develop her capacities,
whatever those capacities may be. Every parent needs to work with both the
child and the social world that the child enters to ensure that the child will
grow into a member who is granted respect and who can develop a sense of
self-respect. No child is simply the parent’s own private matter. If McMahan
and Singer claim to honor my relationship to my child and to grant its moral
significance, then they cannot with any consistency grant the means to fulfill
parental obligations to one parent and deny them to another parent based on
some set of features of the child, for these are what all parents need to fulfill
their ethical responsibilities to their children regardless of their capacities
and needs (“The Personal Is Philosophical Is Political: A Philosopher and
Mother of a Cognitively Disabled Person Sends Notes from the Battlefield,”
Metaphilosophy, July 2009).

This argument secures the rights of handicapped newborns but does not justify
giving similar rights to great apes.
“Hence we have to conclude,” writes Singer in his 2009 article, “that the
standard ethical view that we find expressed in the statement by John Paul II—the
view that all human beings, irrespective of their cognitive abilities, have equal moral
status, and that this status is superior to the moral status of the most intelligent
nonhuman animals—cannot be defended.” Even if Singer had refuted the religious,
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Kantian, and contractarian arguments for basic human equality and superiority over
animals, his conclusion is still a non-sequitur. Surely, we have no reason to think
that there are only three ways to defend the idea that all human beings ought to be
accorded equal rights above nonhuman animals. Conspicuous by absence are the
Aristotelian–Thomistic philosophical arguments that all human beings have equal
basic moral status superior to nonhuman animals.5
Singer makes the point—using extensive empirical evidence—that some
animals (such as great apes, dogs, and grey parrots) have greater cognitive abilities
than some human beings (for instance, the profoundly mentally handicapped and the
newborn).6 Singer assumes, but never justifies through argumentation, that greater
or lesser moral status is correlated to greater or lesser cognitive ability. If we accept
this view, then we not only lose basic human equality, but we also lose the basic
equality of human persons whose cognitive abilities vary widely. We lose or gain
cognitive abilities based on which drugs in our system (Ritalin versus marijuana),
but surely our moral status does not shift episodically. We have strong reason to
reject the idea that greater or lesser moral status is correlated to greater or lesser
cognitive ability.
We also have good reason to reject the view that speciesism is akin to racism
or sexism. Accepting the wrongfulness of speciesism commits one to implications that are deeply counterintuitive. First, if speciesism is wrong, we should not
grant special protections to animals that are members of endangered species, since
being a member of a particular species is morally irrelevant. Second, if speciesism
is wrong, we should also not do anything to help animals of a particular species
that are suffering from overpopulation, since that too would involve treating some
animals differently than others in an ethically significant way based on species
membership.7 Finally, let’s say I rush into a burning building and find both a one
year old girl and her family dog passed out from smoke inhalation, and I only have
time to save one of them. Jamieson notes Singer’s statement that, “everything else
being equal, someone who rejects speciesism should be morally indifferent between

See, for example, James B. Reichmann, Evolution, Animal Rights, and the Environment (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2000).
6
University of California–Santa Barbara neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga emphasizes the vast, quantitative differences between humans taken, collectively, and all other
species, including apes and chimps, taken collectively (“Humans: The Party Animal,”
Daedalus, Summer 2009). The differences in behavior are vast. Birthday parties, wedding
showers, and luncheon receptions are utterly common for us and utterly absent in every
other species. Our physiology is also different. The human brain in not just proportionately
bigger, but it is organized differently than these other species. It is not just a matter of brains
but also other aspects of us that reflect a difference in rationality.
7
For some reflections on this subject, see Donald W. Bruckner’s remarks on animal
overpopulation in his “Considerations on the Morality of Meat Consumption: HuntedGame versus Farm-Raised Animals,” Journal of Social Philosophy 38.2 (Summer 2007):
311–330.
5
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a human and a dog who are at the same level of consciousness.” If speciesism is
wrong, then I should just flip a coin to decide whether to save the girl or the dog.
This is absurd. Much remains to be discussed in terms of the subject of animal
rights, but the arguments advanced against speciesism by Singer and Jamieson fail
to justify their conclusions.
Christopher K aczor, PhD
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California

805

